Judgment enforcement is a tricky thing. It's even harder when there are multiple creditors going after the same pot of money.
In the case of Full Throttle Films, Inc. v. National Mobile Television, creditor Full Throttle tried to collect ~$400k. They filed suit against National Mobile and applied for for a writ of attachment--a pre-judgment remedy. The Court issued the Writ "for any property of a defendant who is not a natural person for which a method of levy is provided." That's nice and broad and even better for Full Throttle, the defendant had over $400k held with a bank.
Unfortunately, Wachovia Capital Finance Corp had a loan agreement with the defendant, and a "control agreement" as well as UCC financing statements to assert that Wachovia could levy the funds in the borrower's bank account (account was NOT with Wachovia). They opposed Full Throttle's Writ and now you have two creditors fighting it out. Full Throttle appealed and won.
Full Throttle obtained their writ of attachment and right to attach order (and apparently served it on the bank) so thye were a lien creditor under Commercial Code Section 9102.
Like real property, it's first come first served, so in order for Wachovia to beat out Full Throttle, they needed to prove they had priority as a senior lien holder, meaning that they had perfected their lien interest BEFORE Full Throttle won their attachment order.
However, Wachovia had NO EVIDENCE of a perfected security interest. That sounds crazy, right? They are a BIG bank, they have expensive lawyers, and they must have had all the right documents, right?
Where was the screw up? Well, apparently the control agreements did specifed two account numbers that were not the accounts with the actual money being levied upon. Doh!
It is unclear from the record if the language of the control agreement permitted control over after acquired accounts not named in the agreement or some kind of dragnet clause to sweep in debtor's accounts. There is no discussion, so I must assume the agreement did not provide for it. Even if the agreement did provide for it, I am not sure that it would have been upheld or what the public policy would be for a "control" agreement that purports to control everything, whether known or unknown that the borrower possesses.
[Full Throttle Films, Inc. v. National Mobile Television, Los Angeles County, 2010 DJDAR 608]